Abstract-Bundle authentication, which ensures the authenticity and integrity of bundles, is critical in space Delay/disruption-Tolerant Networks (DTNs). When bundle fragment services are needed, the previous solutions directly using digital signatures suffer from heavy computational costs and bandwidth overheads. This paper addresses the issue of fragment authentication for Bundle Protocol by exploiting erasure codes and the batch transmission characteristic of DTNs. Erasure codes are adopted to allow all the fragments of a bundle to equally share only one signature, to tolerate high delays as well as unexpected loss of connectivity. Following this generic idea, we present two approaches, both of which are effective in filtering inauthentic fragments as early as possible. The first one takes a surprisingly low bandwidth overhead, while it makes all received fragments of a bundle to be removed when there is an inauthentic one, because of its failure in locating the inauthentic fragments. Considering this defect, we present an improved scheme which is able to detect inauthentic fragments thanks to a special hash chain and then only remove these inauthentic ones. The performance simulation demonstrates that both our schemes significantly reduce bandwidth overheads and computational costs as compared to the prior works.
ANY of the popular applications on Internet today are built on the assumption of immediate end-to-end reachability. However, this assumption never holds true for the space internet, which is recognized as an instance of Delay/disruption-Tolerant Networks (DTNs) [1] . Due to this unique nature of space internet, the traditional security mechanisms are not always applicable, such as bundle authentication. Traditional authentication mechanisms, i.e., calculating a hash, signing the hash and appending the signature to the message, are not optimal when fragmentation of bundles is needed. In this paper, to resist injection attacks and eradicate traffic storms, we consider using the erasure codes combined with signatures to construct efficient authentication mechanisms for BP (Bundle Protocol) fragments.
Space internet. Space internetworking is to built a network in the space, with each orbiter, rover, space-borne telescope, and any other skyward-launched device working as a node. Generally, these skyward-launched devices are used for science and exploration. For space internetworking, Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS) currently recommends a number of candidate technologies, such as CCSDS File Delivery Protocol (CFDP), Internet Protocol (IP) suite and the Bundle Protocol from DTNs. In these protocols, the Bundle Protocol associated with DTNs seems best suited for the space internetworking environment, because it provides long-term information storage on intermediate nodes, just suitable for coping with the space communication challenges, such as disrupted links, long delays, and intermittent connectivity. Like IP, the Bundle Protocol provides an internetwork-layer data unit with end-to-end addressing capabilities. Unlike IP, however, BP does not assume continuous connectivity and specially allows for in-network data storage. The big difference between IP and BP is that IP assumes a seamless end-to-end data path, while BP is built to account for high delays and unexpected loss of connectivity.
Via Bundle Protocol, DTNs can bridge between dissimilar lower-layer networks and can operate simultaneously over heterogeneous networks or even directly over a datalink protocol. Its architecture described in RFC-4838 [2] is a generalized store-and-forward network overlay, and originates from NASA JPL's experiences in developing storeand-forward communication networks for deep space. Currently, DTNs have been investigated for both space and terrestrial scenarios. The terrestrial scenarios include military tactical networking, sparse sensor networks, and networking in developing communication-challenged regions. Nevertheless, the space use case is still the main application scenario of DTNs. Compared with terrestrial DTNs, space DTNs have scheduled, predicted and periodic contacts, which are helpful for designing routing algorithms [3] , [4] and key management protocols [5] .
Bundle authentication for BP. In DTNs, the in-transit PDUs (protocol data unit) of BP, also named bundles can be sent over an existing link and buffered at the next hop until the next link in the path appears. Networking using this bundle-based store-and-forward techniques allows communication over multiple hops in a parallel manner. Without a mechanism for authenticating bundles, malicious routers can arbitrarily inject false information into the bundles. If innocent routers further propagate these injected messages, attackers then are able to generate large amount of malicious traffic in the network. We call this type of attacks as injection attacks, which will lead to traffic storms [6] . Since space DTNs depend on resource-constrained mobile devices, traffic storms may result in a serious threats on the network operation [7] . Therefore, to filter inauthentic messages as early as possible, a secure and efficient bundle authentication mechanism should be in place. Actually, bundles in space DTNs need to be authenticated for several other reasons, such as policy-based routing and forwarding. In addition, the receiver might also need to authenticate the originator for correctly interpreting the contents.
What is needed then, is a standard way for authenticating bundles, the in-transit PDUs of BP. The recognition of this requirement leads to an Internet draft describing a bundle security protocol specification (BSP) [8] given by the DTN Research Group (DTNRG). The specification defines the Payload Integrity Header (PIH) and the Bundle Authentication Header (BAH) to respectively provide end-to-end and hop-by-hop authentication plus integrity validation services on the network layer.
Bundle fragment authentication. In space DTNs, fragmentation of bundles is often needed. What this means is that a large bundle is often split into smaller fragments which are routed through different forwarding paths to make the best use of limited resources. RFC-4838 [2] specifies two types of fragmentation, i.e., proactive fragmentation and reactive fragmentation. Proactive fragmentation means that a node splits a bundle into fragments prior to transmitting it. Reactive fragmentation might occur when the network needs to recover from unexpected loss of link connectivity. Specifically, when the connectivity is suddenly broken off, some intermediate routers may consider to reactively fragment the transmitting bundles, in order to recover from unexpected loss of link connectivity.
Thus, when bundle fragmentation is supported, the PIH and BAH mechanisms given in BSP Specification [8] does not work well, in that appending a signature to each fragment of a bundle will involve a series of performance obstacles: high transmission overheads, computational costs and energy consumption. Obviously, the large size of digital signatures will lead to increasing extra transmission overheads, and verifying those individual signatures one by one at each intermediate DTN router and the receiver will significantly increase the computational costs. Another unapparent performance obstacle is energy consumption. In fact, the high transmission and computational overhead also translates to high energy consumption [9] . This performance issue becomes more challenging when multi-copy or even flooding based propagation method is employed [10] , [11] , since the signature transmission and verification are performed along each fragment delivery path.
Here we give an example to explicitly illustrate this problem. Assume a bundle is fragmented into 16 fragments. Then, according to the trivial approach given by DTNRG [12] , the sender has to generate 16 signatures, each of which is appended to a fragment, and the receiver (or an intermediate node) has to verify 16 signatures. What is more, the network has to transmit these 16 signatures for only one bundle. Obviously, the communication overheads as well as the computational costs of both the sender and the receiver are greatly increased. The DTN copy routing will further aggravate this performance problem. This paper discusses methods to authenticate bundle fragments for space DTNs. There are two basic requirements for bundle fragment authentication. One is that the bandwidth overhead and computational cost should be kept to minimum, and not increase with the fragment numbers. Another basic requirement is to tolerate loss of fragments. That is, loss of some fragments does not affect the authenticity and integrity verification for the remainder fragments; and intermediate routers are able to verify the received fragments even if other fragments of the same bundle are routed to other paths.
Our contributions. This paper focuses on "how to authenticate bundle fragments for BP of space internet efficiently in computation and communication". We aim to minimize the costs of computation/communication and to tolerate the nature of multi-hop parallel forwarding of BP as well.
To this end, we use a combination of signature techniques with erasure codes operated on packet-sized data objects. Erasure codes are utilized to adapt to high delay, unexpected loss of connectivity, and to allow the transmission overhead from the only one signature to be equally shared by all fragments, each of which carries a lower overhead. In this way, the signature and the hashes of the fragments of a bundle are encoded to generate n codewords appended to n fragments one by one, where only a portion of them are sufficient to authenticate all the fragments belonging to the bundle. Such an approach is able to tolerate fragment loss due to high delay and unexpected loss of connectivity, and also adapts to the BP nature of routing fragments of the same bundle possibly via different paths.
On the above-mentioned basis, we propose two candidate approaches, both of which are effective in filtering inauthentic fragments and resisting injection attacks. The first one adds a surprisingly low extra overhead to BP, but it makes all received fragments of a bundle to be removed when there is an inauthentic fragment, because of its failure in identifying the inauthentic fragments. In the second approach, considering this defect, we suggest utilizing a specially linked hash chain to identify maliciously injected or modified fragments. Our performance evaluations justified the merits of both schemes.
Paper organization. The remaining sections are arranged as follows. In Section 2, we revisit DTNs security issues and fragment authentication for BP. In Section 3, we describe the models and our design goals. In Section 4, we will present our first erasure codes based scheme, which is improved in Section 5 by utilizing a novel hash chain to filter inauthentic fragments. Section 6 focuses on security analysis, followed by the complexity comparison with the existing methods in Section 7. Section 8 concludes the paper.
RELATED WORK
DTN security and bundle authentication. Security issue is one of the major challenges for DTN deployment. Farrell and Cahill review the current state of DTN security works in [7] . They point out that the main threats for DTNs are modification of messages (or "bundles"), unauthorized use of scarce DTN resources and denial of service. With respect to DTN security, the DTN Bundle Security Specification [8] defines the Payload Integrity Header, the Payload Confidentiality Header (PCH) and the Bundle Authentication Header to provide security services on the network layer. An additional draft [13] explains the rationale for the design choices made in this specification. Even though the current specification has provided a general framework to secure space DTNs and it also holds the advantage of providing interoperability, there are still two open issues: fragment authentication issue and performance issue.
Due to fragmentation, traditional authentication schemes [8] , e.g., the sender generates the signature over an entire message, may not work well since the intermediate receiver cannot authenticate any of the received fragments if it has not yet received the entire message. To address this problem, a trivial approach was proposed in [12] and has come up at the DTNRG mailing list discussions. The main idea is to make each fragment self-authenticating by attaching a signature to each fragment separately. Obviously, this approach leads to a more serious performance issue, since the intermediate nodes have to take more computational and transmission efforts for transmitting and verifying a growing number of signatures.
Aiming to achieve advantages in efficiency over the trivial scheme in [12] , Partridge suggests to use cumulative authentication in which each fragment is authenticated by calculating a hash over all the previous fragments including the current fragment [14] . Obviously, it assumes that fragments are received in order, which might not be the case always. This approach only reduces the computation costs for the receiver, compared with the trivial approach in [12] . Asokan et al. [6] presents a binary hash tree (or Merkle Tree) based fragment authentication approach in which each fragment has to carry log 2 n hash values for verifying itself. Accordingly, it is very expensive when n is large. The previous contribution by Zhu et al. [15] presents an opportunistic batch authentication scheme, in which the well known Merkle Tree is used to reduce communication overhead and a batch verifiable signature is used to decrease the computation costs of the receiver. Their latest work focuses on probabilistic misbehavior detection mechanisms for secure DTN routing [16] .
Another related issue is reliability. In order for providing reliable transmission, BP is specially designed based on custody transfer technology [1] . In addition, reliability issue in space networks has also been explored in terms of coding on bundles [17] , [18] , [19] . By combining the two mechanisms, custody transfer and coding on bundles, T. de Cola and M. Marchese proposed a two-level protection scheme and explored its performance [20] . Their simulations show that this two-level protection results in performance degradation because coding on bundles of big sizes is costly in terms of computation and communication while skywardlaunched devices generally have limited capacity.
Erasure coding. Now we give a brief introduction to the principle of erasure codes, especially clarifying their special operation manner here.
An erasure encoding algorithm C k;r takes a set X ¼ fx 1 ; x 2 ; . . . ; x k g of k original packets as input and produces ðk þ rÞ encoded packets: fy 1 ; . . . ; y kþr g C k;r ðXÞ. Under optimal erasure coding, any k-element subset of Y ¼ fy 1 ; . . . ; y kþr g is sufficient to recover the original data X via the decoding algorithm D k . In other words, erasure codes are able to reconstruct the original data at most r erasures.
The maximum loss rate is r k þ r , that is, the ratio of the number of redundancy codewords to the number of total codewords. In practice, an implementer often use near optimal erasure coding that requires k þ " packets to reconstruct the original data, as optimal coding is expensive in terms of CPU and memory usage. In this paper, as in previous studies, we ignore " in further analysis for simplicity.
Rizzo [21] presents an erasure code which is flexible and efficient to implement, and discusses various issues related to its performance. Reed-Solomon erasure codes given in [22] operate in GF ð2 n Þ and may be inefficient for large data packets with several hundreds of kilobytes for each. However, they are appropriate for our scenario because we operate on hash values (typically 16 or 20 bytes) that are much smaller than packets. Rizzo also suggested to use erasure codes in multicast and broadcast applications, which is instantiated in [23] . M.O. Rabin proposed an Information Dispersal Algorithm (IDA) [24] , in which a file is broken into multiple fragments before sending out, and only a portion of the fragments suffices for reconstructing the original file. This algorithm can be viewed as belonging to the field of erasure codes. In this paper, we suggest to consider the so-called linear systematic codes, such as erasure codes based on Vandermonde matrices [21] and systematic Reed-Solomon codes [22] , since they are simple and appropriate for the application scenario of our interest.
It is important to note that erasure codes are used here in a completely new manner. On one hand, erasure codes are operated on packet-sized data objects. On the other hand, we use coding on small authentication tags, instead of packets themselves as reliable transmission mechanisms based on erasure codes in space networks [17] , [18] , [20] , [25] , [26] .
MODELS AND DESIGN GOALS
In this section, we describe the system and adversary models, followed by our design goals.
System model. We consider space DTNs which can bridge between dissimilar lower-layer subnetworks and operate simultaneously over heterogeneous subnetworks by using the Bundle Protocol suits. In such a space internet, a source node can deliver bundles to a destination node via one or multiple paths depending on any particular forwarding algorithm [11] . In intermediate nodes, these bundles will be manipulated based on two special technologies: store-andforward and custody transfer [1] . Store-and-forward means storing data before it is forwarded. If no outbound path is currently available, PDUs will be stored for arbitrary lengths of time. Custody transfer is a network service that provides reliability. With custody transfer, a DTN node is responsible for retransmitting data if that data is lost in progress towards its data destination. This reliability service provides an optimal scenario for our authentication scheme.
Further, a bundle may be split inside the network [1] . What this means is that the source or an intermediate node can split a large bundle into smaller fragments and route different fragments possibly through different forwarding paths, to adapt to high delay/disruption space links and make the best use of limited resources. In addition, this paper follows a general assumption such as [27] that there exits an Offline Security Manager to issue certificate for traditional public key cryptosystems or to generate private key for identity based cryptosystems.
Threats against space DTNs. As usual, threats can be passive or active. Passive attacks include eavesdropping and traffic analysis. Examples of active attacks are masquerading, message modification and injection attack. CCSDS has produced a green book [28] presenting generic threats to space missions. In this paper, we consider how to protect bundles or fragments from the adversaries of masquerading, message modification and injection attack. Injection attack means that malicious routers arbitrarily inject false fragments into the bundles. However, we assume that authentication is useful when the adversary injects fragments at a relatively low rate. If too many fragments are injected, it will lead to a denial-ofservice attack anyway. In this case, the primary concern is not authentication. Further, we consider neither adversaries able to compromise DTN nodes, nor adversaries aiming at signature algorithm itself. Uniformly, we call the modified, injected and error fragments as inauthentic fragments.
In addition, the space link characteristics, such as long delays, link asymmetry, and constrained bandwidth, may make security recovery from attack more difficult than in traditional terrestrial networks. According to this, the following requirements should be fully considered when we design security mechanisms for space DTNs.
Due to long delays, security processing should be minimized. Due to link asymmetry and bandwidth limitation, the bandwidth overheads resulted from security should be minimized. Due to packet losses and frequent link disruptions, security schemes should include proper reliability mechanisms. These considerations are included into our design goals in this paper.
Design goals. Our security design goal is straightforward, i.e., eradicating inauthentic fragments of bundles and resisting injection attacks with low costs in terms of communication and computation. To be specific, when a DTN bundle is fragmented, the signature for this bundle is shared by all of its fragments, and all received or relayed fragments should be authenticated even if some other fragments of the same bundle are lost or routed via other paths. In this way, the inauthentic fragments can be efficiently rejected or filtered as early as possible. Meanwhile we concentrate on minimizing the costs, including computational costs, communication overheads and energy consumption due to authentication for bundle fragments. Further, we need to exactly identify inauthentic fragments and therefore only remove these inauthentic fragments.
THE BASIC SCHEME
In this section, we propose a bundle fragment authentication scheme which aims to dramatically reduce the computational overhead by exploiting only one signature and one verification for all fragments of the same bundle. We take advantage of erasure coding technique to tolerate unexpected loss of fragments and the DTN nature of routing fragments of the same bundle via different paths.
Our fragment authentication scheme is parameterized by n the bundle size in fragments and p the average probability which is achieved via a history learning process. The variables and notations appearing throughout this paper are explicitly defined in Table 1 .
Authentication Algorithms for BP Fragments
The objective of the following Algorithm 1 is to generate a set of security tags from the signature of a bundle and respectively append each of them to a fragment of this bundle, so that the receiver and intermediate routers can verify and distinguish the authentic fragments conditioned on correctly receiving at least np authentic fragments.
Encoding and generating tags. We assume that a bundle is fragmented into n fragments f 1 ; f 2 ; . . . ; f n , each of which will piggyback an authentication tag before transmission. The authentication tags are extracted as follows: Algorithm 1. Tag generation with twice encoding 1) Let X ¼ fh 1 ; h 2 ; . . . ; h n jh i Hðf i Þ; i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; ng, i.e., compute the hash value for each fragment; 2) Encode: fX; X 0 g C n;r ðXÞ, where fX 0 g includes the redundancy codewords; 3) s SðK s ; Hðh 1 kh 2 k Á Á Á kh n ÞÞ, i.e., generate the signature s; 4) Split ðskX 0 Þ into bpnc blocks B ¼ fB 1 ; B 2 ; . . . ; B bpnc g with the same size; 5) Encode: fB; B 0 g C bpnc;nÀbpnc ðBÞ, where fB 0 g includes the redundancy codewords; 6) Append the codewords of fB; B 0 g, represented by T ¼ ft 1 ; t 2 ; . . . ; t n g, to the n fragments one by one. Here, we denote by S a digital signature algorithm and by s the resulting signature signed with private key K s . In this algorithm, we let C n;r be an erasure encoding algorithm with r extra redundancy codewords and total ðn þ rÞ codewords. The number of extra redundancy codewords r satisfies two requirements: (1) r is larger than or equal to dð1 À pÞne for successfully decoding in Step 4 of the following Algorithm 2; and (2) enough redundancy codewords make space networks be able to withstand the average probability of p. Then, r is determined by this average probability p and a concrete coding algorithm. For example, if we use the erasure code based on Vandermonde matrices [21] whose maximum loss rate is r n þ r , the number r must satisfy the relation 1 À p r n þ r and the minimum value of r is d ð1 À pÞn p e. We also use the erasure code based on Vandermonde matrices for C bpnc;nÀbpnc ðBÞ, aiming to get exactly n codewords of fB; B 0 g. Thus we must split ðskX 0 Þ into bpnc blocks with same sizes and each block B i is an original word to be coded.
Note in particular that the Vandermonde matrices based erasure code used here is just for illustration. Our schemes (including the improved schemes in Section 5) are general and the erasure codes used in them can be chosen as needed. An implementer can also use Reed-Solomon codes (including systematic codes and the original non-systematic codes) and the Information Dispersal Algorithm given by M.O. Rabin [24] . Nevertheless, we only recommend using systematic codes. This property is not necessary for the correctness of the proposed schemes, but gives an extra desirable property to our construction and requires no extra computational effort. This desirable property is that verifiers do not need to decode when there is no erasure.
Decoding and verification. Consider the set R ¼ fR i g of the received fragments, where R i ¼ ff Here, DðÁÞ is the decoding algorithm. This decoding and verification process tells us that any subset of ff 1 ; f 2 ; . . . ; f n g can be authenticated if the verifier receives at least bpnc authentic fragments. In other words, this scheme for fragment authentication is able to tolerate at most n À bpnc lost fragments. This means that if the average probability p is accurately estimated, the only one signature equally shared by all fragments can authenticate all the fragments of a bundle. Thus, we can effectively reduce the transmission cost as well as computational cost, and therefor decrease the energy consumption due to bundle fragment authentication. It is important to note that the decoding algorithm needs to know the positions, or indexes, of the received fragments and this information can be derived from the sequence numbers of the fragments in PDUs.
Correctness. Erasure coding is invertible, i.e., the decoding operation is able to completely reconstruct the original codewords as long as the number of the erased words satisfies the maximum loss rate [21] . The invertibility of erasure coding guarantees that Algorithm 2 is the inverse operation of Algorithm 1. This presents the correctness of our algorithms, that is, a receiver (or a DTN router) can successfully verify the authenticity of the received fragments (or relayed fragments) even if there are some fragments belonging to the same bundle are lost or routed via other paths. In fact, the decoding process DðT Þ in Algorithm 2 is the inverse operation of the encoding process C bpnc;nÀbpnc ðBÞ in Algorithm 1, and Step 2 of Algorithm 2 is the inverse operation of Step 4 of Algorithm 1. Similarly, DðE; X 0 Þ (Step 4) in Algorithm 2 is the inverse operation of C n;r ðXÞ (Step 2) in Algorithm 1. Besides, the verification in Algorithm 2
Step 5 is the inverse operation of the signing operation of Algorithm 1 Step 3. Here, note in particular that the average loss rate 1 À p is not larger than nÀbpnc n , the maximum loss rate of C bpnc;nÀbpnc ðÁÞ; and r, the number of redundancy codewords of C n;r ðXÞ, is larger than or equal to dð1 À pÞne. This allows successfully decoding in Algorithm 2 Step 4. Thus, in the statistical sense, the signature resulted from Algorithm 1 can be reconstructed via two decoding operations, and the authenticity of the fragments can be verified via verifying operation (Algorithm 2 Step 5).
Parameters and Performance Evaluation
Using learning to approximate p. In order to utilize erasure cods, we need the global information such as the probability p. This can be achieved by a history learning process [29] . For example, each node records the number of total received fragments and the number of authentic fragments belonging to the same bundle during a specific past time duration. It also periodically updates and broadcasts its probability information. The node computes the overall approximation of p based on its local record and the received neighboring information. Thus, all nodes will have the global and accurate view about the network history. This history can be limited to some time duration if the network size is large.
In addition, from the following analysis and evaluation, we know that the lower probability p will result in more redundancy codewords. Theoretically, the erasure coding can withstand arbitrarily small p. In other words, enough extra redundancy will always make all fragments of a bundle to be authenticated. However we need to relate the parameters n, r and p to concrete average network patterns in space. That is, the sender needs to adjust the parameter r such that most bundles would be verifiable.
Size of an authentication tag. Let h define the length of a cryptographic hash and s the size of a signature. The size of an individual authentication tag is expressed as ðn; pÞ, the function of both the number of fragments of a bundle and the average probability p. From Algorithm 1, we have
This ðn; pÞ presents the bandwidth overhead of our bundle fragment authentication scheme, and remains surprisingly small if either n is large or p is reasonably high. The simulations presented in [15] show that, in a high traffic load case, there exist up to 98:25 percent DTN contacts during which DTN transmission is performed in a batch (two or more bundles are transferred simultaneously). This result also applies to the fragments of the same bundle, i.e., most fragments of the same bundle are transferred simultaneously in DTNs. This means that the average probability p with which all fragments of the same bundle are routed to the same intermediate router (or node) is sufficiently high. Thus, our scheme will place a very low bandwidth overhead to BP for fragment authentication. With s ¼ 128 bytes and h ¼ 16 bytes, we present a sampling of ðn; pÞ for different p and n in Table 2 . Note that we let the value of in the following table to be the lowest multiple of bpnc greater than or equivalent to ðrh þ sÞ.
Computation costs. The main computation cost for a sender comes from two coding operations, generating n hash values and one digital signature. Here, note that the erasure coding operates on small authentication tags and thus is relatively efficient.
The computation cost for the verifier depends on the number of the received fragments. It only needs to compute n hashes, verifies one signature and does not need decoding in an ideal situation (the best case), i.e., there is no erasure, since the erasure codes are used in a systematic way here. If the receiver does not receive all the fragments of a bundle, it will need to carry out some operations for additional decoding. The decoding is utilized to recover the hashes of the missed fragments, instead of the fragments themselves. Thus, the decoding is not expensive since the tags are much smaller than general packets. On average, if the verifier gets at least bpnc fragments belonging to the same bundle it will be able to completely reconstruct the authentication information and verify these fragments. At the worst case, the verifier does not receive enough fragments and it cannot decode to reconstruct the authentication information. To decrease the probability of this case, an implementer can choose to increase the number of the redundancy codewords. Theoretically, the erasure coding can withstand arbitrarily small p and enough extra redundancy will always make the verification successful.
Discussion about injection attacks. The above scheme is able to eradicate traffic storms in that any injected false information into bundles will be filtered as early as possible by signature verification at the intermediate routers.
Actually, it makes all received fragments of a bundle to be removed even if there is one inauthentic fragment, because it can not locate the inauthentic fragments. This may be an issue in a sense and can be addressed by each fragment carrying more extra authentication information. However, it shows a trade-off between the performance and bandwidth overhead. To locate the inauthentic fragments and to exactly recover the authentication information, a sender must augment each fragment with enough redundancy information. What follows is an improved scheme with this idea.
THE IMPROVED SCHEME FOR IDENTIFYING INAUTHENTIC FRAGMENTS
In this section, we give an improved scheme, in which we utilize a special hash chain to detect inauthentic fragments. Erasure coding is still adopted to tolerate fragment loss and the nature of multi-hop parallel forwarding of BP as well.
With this scheme, a verifier is able to identify the authentic fragments and just remove the inauthentic fragments.
Construction of Special Hash Chain
The objective is to generate a set of verification tags and append them to the fragments one by one, such that a receiver can verify and distinguish the fragments belonging to the same bundle. Here, we still let the fragments of a bundle to be f 1 ; f 2 ; . . . ; f n , each of which will piggyback a verification tag derived from a special hash chain before transmission. The hash chain called L is constructed as Fig. 1 . As illustrated in Fig. 1 , each fragment f i piggybacks a tag derived from the hash valve of its preceding fragment f iÀ1 , i.e., f i k h i and h i ¼ Hðf i kh iÀ1 Þ. The hash chain is initialized at h 1;1 ¼ Hðf 1 Þ and h 2 ¼ Hðf 2 kh 1;1 Þ. Here HðÁÞ is a collisionresistant hash function. The final fragment carries a hash of the entire message. Note that h 1;2 ¼ Hðf 1 kh n Þ makes the hash chain to be an inseparable whole. This chain, hashlinking each fragment to its preceding fragment, will lead to an unbreakable cyclic dependency among the fragments of a same bundle. This specially linked hash chain effectively prevents an adversary to insert malicious fragments without violating the hash verification. We assume that f attack modifying all fragments with the indexes from some j to n. Obviously, inauthentic fragments will be found easily unless all fragments of the target bundle are replaced.
Fragment Authentication Based on Hash Chain
Although the above-mentioned hash chain is effective in resisting inauthentic fragments, it is built on the assumption that all fragments are received. However, this assumption never holds true for space DTNs, because fragments are possibly lost and fragments of the same bundle might be routed via different paths. Both make the verification at intermediate routers and the receiver to fail. Aiming to address this issue, we utilize erasure codes to recover the missing hashes on the chain L so that all received or relayed fragments should be verified even if some other fragments of the same bundle are lost or routed via other paths. Thereby the inauthentic fragments can be efficiently filtered as early as possible. In addition, the signature is used to authenticate their common origin or source.
In the following Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4, the couple ðS; V Þ still denotes the signature and verification algorithms respectively. The hashes h 1;1 ; h 1;2 ; h 2 ; h 3 ; . . . ; h n are those on the chain of Fig. 1 This algorithm uses the same encoding algorithm C bpnc;nÀbpnc as Algorithms 1. In addition, an implementer can also utilize an error correction and erasure code (such as the RS error correction and erasure code) to replace the erasure code used here. For example, we can use RS code as fB; B 0 g À C brnþ1c;nÀbrnþ1c ðBÞ at Step 3 of Algorithms 3,
ð1 þ Þb and the tolerance parameter of the decoder is known to the decoder [30] . The ratio b ! 1 is not too high and means there might be at most ðbn À nÞ inauthentic fragments. Just as p, b can be approximated via a history learning process. Of course, the decoding algorithm in the following Algorithm 4 must be replaced with RS decoding algorithm as well. This enables the scheme to perform better. That is, the scheme will be able to tolerate some errors that might appear in the tags t 1 ; t 2 ; . . . ; t n , since error correction and erasure codes have the ability of error correction plus erasure reconstruction. The similar improvement can also be implemented to our scheme in Section 4, i.e, utilizing an error correction and erasure code in Step 5 of Algorithm 1. Similarly, the corresponding decoding algorithm, Step 1 of Algorithm 2, must also be replaced.
In terms of Algorithm 3, the corresponding decoding and verification are presented in Algorithm 4. Here, DðÁÞ denotes the decoding algorithm and T 0 is the set including all tags carried by the received fragments with correct indexes. The set R ¼ fR i g contains the received fragments, in which R i ¼ ff 0 i kt i g (The index i is f 0 i 's position in the original fragment chain.), or R i ¼ ? taking the position of the lost fragments on the original chain. As the previous scheme given in Section 4, any subset of ff 1 ; f 2 ; . . . ; f n g can be authenticated if the set R includes at least bpnc authentic fragments. That is, this scheme can tolerate at most n À bpnc erased fragments.
Correctness. Similar to the scheme in Section 4, the invertibility of erasure coding guarantees that a receiver (or a DTN router) can successfully verify the authenticity of the received fragments (or relayed fragments), even if some fragments belonging to the same bundle are lost or routed via other paths. Factually, the decoding process DðT 0 Þ in Algorithm 4 is the inverse operation of the encoding process C bpnc;nÀbpnc ðBÞ in Algorithm 3, because the average loss rate 1 À p is not larger than nÀbpnc n , the maximum loss rate of C bpnc;nÀbpnc ðÁÞ. Thus, in the statistical sense, the signature and the hash chain resulted from Algorithm 3 can be reconstructed via decoding operation, and the authenticity of the fragments can be verified via verifying operation (Algorithm 4 Step 4). In addition, the hash chain enables the receiver to identify the authentic fragments and remove the inauthentic ones, in that the hash chain gives an unbreakable cyclic dependency among the fragments belonging to a same bundle.
Performance Evaluation
Size of an authentication tag. The size of an individual authentication tag is expressed as 0 ðn; pÞ determined by both the number of bundle fragments and the average probability p. According to Algorithm 3, we have 0 ðn; pÞ ¼ s þ ðn þ 1Þh bpnc which is larger than that of the scheme in Section 4. This 0 ðn; pÞ presents the communication overhead.
To evaluate the communication overhead, we still refer to the simulation result of [15] , which tells us that most fragments of the same bundle are transferred simultaneously in DTNs, i.e., the average probability p is enough high in general. With s ¼ 128 bytes and h ¼ 16 bytes, we present a sampling of 0 ðn; pÞ for different p and n in Table 3 . Note that we let the value of 0 in the following table to be the lowest integer greater than or equivalent to 0 ðn; pÞ. It is observed form Table 3 that the authentication tags are obviously larger when compared with the scheme in Section 4. Nevertheless, it is much better than the trivial scheme proposed in [12] .
Computation costs. For the above scheme based on the hash chain L, the main computation cost of a sender comes from generating ðn þ 1Þ hash values, one digital signature, and one time encoding.
The computation cost of the verifier depends on the number of received fragments. In an ideal situation, receiving all fragments of a bundle, the receiver just computes ðn þ 1Þ hashes and verifies a signature, since it does not need to decode. If the receiver does not receive all the fragments of a bundle, it needs some additional decoding operations.
Discussion about Injection Attacks. This scheme is able to eradicate traffic storms because any injected false fragments will be filtered out. It is important to note that this scheme can effectively find the inauthentic fragments and thereafter remove only the inauthentic fragments rather than all the received fragments as [15] , or the entire bundle as [8] .
SECURITY ANALYSIS
Before analyzing the security, we must mention the security parameter. Our schemes are general and the signature algorithm used in them can be chosen as needed. Suppose that an implementer choose a signature algorithm SðK s ; ÁÞ, whose key-generation algorithm is implicitly specified as taking the security parameter k as input. That is, the secret key K s is a random bit string of given length k. In the following, we suppose that we have an adversary A managing to break the security of our scheme with non-negligible probability determined by k. Then, we give the following informal definition in terms of the security of the proposed schemes. Definition 1. The proposed schemes are secure if no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A can win the following game with a non-negligible probability. In the game, the adversary A is given the public key and oracle access to Algorithm 1 (or Algorithm 3), but it can only issue at most one query with the same bundle identification (BID). It outputs a BID and a set of fragments R ¼ fR 1 ; R 2 ; . . . ; R n g, where
The adversary wins if it managed to construct R in such a way that Algorithm 2 (or Algorithm 4) will output fragments that were never authenticated by Algorithm 1 (or Algorithm 3) for the identification BID. Specifically, the adversary A wins if one of the following happens: Following this definition, we will prove the security of the scheme given in Section 5. The similar reduction can also be used to prove the security of the scheme proposed in Section 4. So we omit it.
Claim: If a polynomial-time adversary A violates the security property of the scheme given in Section 5, then the underlying signature algorithm SðK s ; ÁÞ is not secure, or the underlying hash function HðÁÞ is not collision-resistant.
Proof (sketch): We prove this theorem by demonstrating the following reduction transforming an attack against our scheme into an attack on the underlying signature algorithm. t u
Reduction. The adversary A has access to the signing algorithm SðK s ; ÁÞ, but not access to the secret key K s . It can use the public key as well as the hash function HðÁÞ. We suppose that HðÁÞ is a cryptographic hash function in the random oracle model. Then it is collision-resistant. Note that the adversary A is given the public key and oracle access to Algorithm 3, but it can only issue at most one query with the same block identification BID. The reduction needs to be able to answer the adversary's queries to Algorithm 3. For responding to a query ðBID; F ¼ ff 1 ; f 2 ; . . . ; f n gÞ, it runs Algorithm 3 with the following modification: in Step 1 of Algorithm 3, instead of computing the signature s, it queries the signature oracle. Others are carried out as defined by Algorithm 3.
Obviously, the adversary's view in this reduction is same as its view in the real life. Accordingly, just as often as in the real life, the adversary violates the security property of the proposed scheme. That is, one of the following cases holds: 1) Algorithm 3 was never queried with the identification BID, and yet Algorithm 4 successfully verified the input fragments with their authentication tags. 2) Algorithm 3 was queried with the identified BID, and data fragments F ¼ ff 1 ; f 2 ; . . . ; f n g. In particular, let s be the signature associated with this query, that is, s SðK s ; h n Þ. However, Algorithm 4 successfully verified some fragment f 0 j different from the corresponding data fragment f j . Suppose the first case holds. Then, according to Algorithm 4, we know that only if it sees a hash link H 0 and a signature s derived from a set B such that V ðs; h 0 n Þ ¼ true, it will output a not-empty set of authentic fragments. Since the signature oracle was never queried for this BID, s is a successful forgery.
Suppose the second case holds. In terms of case 2, we get that either Hðf j kh jÀ1 Þ 6 ¼ Hðf 0 j kh jÀ1 Þ or it is easy to find a collision to the hash function. By the definition of Algorithm 4, if f j 2 F , then the algorithm process s and fh 1;1 ; h 2 ; h 3 ; . . . ; h n ; h 1;2 g such that V ðs; h n Þ ¼ true. We must argue that the signature oracle was never queried with input ðBID; fh 1;1 ; h 2 ; h 3 ; . . . ; h n ; h 1;2 gÞ. Note that the only time it was queried with this BID is when we obtained s on the input of hash link from ff 1 ; f 2 ; . . . ; f n g. Moreover, Algorithm 4 accepts f 0 j as an authentic fragment if and only if Hðf 0 j kh jÀ1 Þ ¼ h j . Therefore, h j ¼ Hðf 0 j kh jÀ1 Þ, and so the signature oracle was never queried with fh 1;1 ; h 2 ; h 3 ; . . . ; h n ; h 1;2 g. However, the adversary has caused us to compute a signature s such that V ðs; h n Þ ¼ true. Thus, we obtain either a successful forgery or a hash function collision in the same manner.
COMPLEXITY COMPARISON
In this section, we will demonstrate the advantages of our schemes by comparing them with the existing methods such as [6] , [12] , [15] . With respect to the security property, all these schemes, including ours, are secure on condition that the underlying signature algorithm is secure and the underlying hash function is in the random oracle model. With the scheme in [6] , it might happen that an intermediate router can not verify its received fragments, if it does not receive the fragment that carries the signature (lost or routed via other paths). Neither the method in [15] , nor our first scheme, is able to locate the inauthentic fragments. Thus, they make all received fragments of a bundle to be removed even if there is one inauthentic fragment. Both the approach in [12] and our second scheme are able to exactly identify the inauthentic fragments and just reject them. Next, we further give the complexity comparison in order to explicitly show how well our schemes work against the existing methods in terms of bandwidth overhead and computational cost. Theoretical analysis. The theoretical comparison, with respect to bandwidth overhead and computational cost, is shown in the following Table 4 . In this table, n is the number of the fragments; "H." and "S." respectively mean a hash operation and a signature operation; "V." means an operation of verifying a signature. "E." and "D." respectively denote encoding and decoding; h and s still represent the length of a hash value and the size of a signature respectively; " is the height of the Merkle tree used in [15] . According to [15] , the parameter " is determined by the number of the fragments and the dynamic network scenario. Besides, we denote the bandwidth overhead by the average size of authentication tags. Table 4 shows that all the approaches of [6] , [15] and ours have advantages over the trivial scheme [12] . The method of [15] has the lowest computational cost for verifiers and the highest bandwidth overhead. Nevertheless, both our schemes in this paper have the smallest bandwidth overhead and the lowest computation cost at the sender.
With a further analysis, it is observed that the schemes in both [6] and [15] obviously increase the bandwidth overhead compared with the trivial method in [12] . Factually, the scheme in [6] makes the signature of the Merkle tree root to be carried by only one of the fragments, and other fragments just carry log n hash values for verifying itself. Then, the authentication failure might appear. That is, an intermediate router can not verify its received fragments, if it does not receive the fragment that carries the signature. The solution for this problem is to make every fragment carry the signature of the Merkle tree root plus the log n hash values. This will greatly increase its bandwidth overhead to ðlog nÞh þ s per fragment.
In addition, here it is important to note that the decoding cost [21] , slightly larger than the encoding cost, is OðlkÞ, where l is the actual number of the missing source blocks and k is the number of the source blocks. Generally, the encoding/decoding cost is much less than the signature/verification cost, since the former is a secondary complexity while the latter is generally a cube complexity. For example, the computation complexity of RSA is OðlogðNÞ 3 Þ, and N is very large in practice, such as a 1,024-bit number or a 2,048 bit number for higher security standard. When n < 256, the encoding/ decoding operation on our small authentication tags (128 bit) is really efficient, just as illustrated in the simulation below. In fact, 256 is enough for the application scenario of our interest. Simulation. We test the proposed schemes on the public available simulators Satellite Tool Kits (STK) [31] and Opportunistic Networking Environment (ONE) [32] , and evaluate the performance under a specific scenario including one moving node and four stationary nodes. The moving node serves as LEO satellite with the height of 778 km and the speed of 7.46 km/s. The four stationary nodes act as ground stations with the longitude and latitude of (109.505, 18.2431), (75.9797, 39.4547), (121.368, 31.1094) and (130.35, 46.8333). We take the parameters of LEO satellite and the ground stations as the inputs of STK simulator, and get the satellite orbit. Then, the longitude and latitude pairs of the outputted orbit are transformed to the standard (x,y) plane coordinates, which are edited as Well-known text (WKT) files. Thereafter, these WKT files are taken as the inputs of the ONE simulator.
Based on the above scenario setting, we choose 1,024-bit RSA as the signature algorithm and SHA-1 as the hash function, and implement our schemes on top of Spray and Waiting routing protocol [33] . We evaluate the computational cost and the bandwidth overhead of the schemes under different fragment numbers. A bundle is fragmented at the probability of 0.7 and not fragmented at the probability of 0.3. The simulation results are shown from Figs. 2 to 5, in which the blue curves correspond to the scheme given in Section 4 and the red curves correspond to the scheme in Section 5. It is observed that the scheme given in Section 4 places a lower bandwidth overhead to a bundle than the scheme given in Section 5, while the later has less computational cost. Both our schemes have obvious advantages over the trivial scheme [12] with respect to bandwidth overhead and computational cost. In particular, note that 1,024-bit RSA and SHA-1 used here are just for simulating and comparing the performance. If they are replaced with other algorithms, the same contrast effect will be demonstrated. Factually, our schemes are general and the signature algorithm as well as the hash function used in them can be chosen as needed. An implementer can also use other cryptographic algorithms with higher security standard as application requirements. Both the theoretical analysis and the simulation demonstrate that our schemes have obvious advantages over others in terms of both computation and communication. This directly leads to its advantage in energy consumption, because the transmission and computation overhead definitely translates to energy consumption. The energy consumption resulted from authentication includes the computational energy consumption and the transmission energy consumption as well. The former is obvious, while the latter is somewhat unapparent. Factually, to receive and transmit one byte respectively consumes energy of 28:6 Â 10 À6 and 59:2 Â 10 À6 Joule ½7. The advantage in energy consumption is very desirable, since the DTN nodes are typically battery-powered devices and energy consumption is a major concern for this type of networks.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, by exploiting the well known erasure codes, we have given two candidate approaches for bundle fragment authentication in space DTNs. Both of them are effective in resisting injection attacks and eradicating traffic storms. The performance simulation demonstrates that the first one places a surprisingly low bandwidth overhead to a bundle, while the second one based on a specially linked hash chain holds the advantages of both reducing computational cost and exactly identifying inauthentic fragments.
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